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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditionally secure key distribution between two
parties and has been recently demonstrated over satellite-to-Earth channels using discrete variable
(DV) technology. It remains unclear whether QKD would be viable over the same channels using
continuous variable (CV) technology. Currently, QKD using CV technology has only been demon-
strated over short-range terrestrial links. Here we attempt to answer whether CV-QKD over the
much longer satellite-to-Earth channel is feasible. To this end, we first review the concepts and
technologies that will enable CV-QKD over the satellite-to-Earth channels. We then consider, in
the infinite key limit, the simplest-to-deploy QKD protocols, the coherent state (CS) QKD protocol
with homodyne detection and the CS-QKD protocol with heterodyne detection. We then focus
on the CS-QKD protocol with heterodyne detection in the pragmatic setting of finite keys, where
complete security against general attacks is known. We pay particular attention to the relevant
noise terms in the satellite-to-Earth channel and their impact on the secret key rates. In system
set-ups where diffraction dominates losses, we find that the main components of the total excess
noise are the intensity fluctuations due to scintillation, and the time-of-arrival fluctuations between
signal and local oscillator. We conclude that for a wide range of pragmatic system models, CS-QKD
with information-theoretic unconditional security in the satellite-to-Earth channel is feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides uncondi-
tionally secure key distribution between two parties. Lo-
cal data sent by a sender, Alice, is encrypted using a
key that is guaranteed by quantum mechanics to be se-
curely shared only with the receiving party, Bob. QKD
is mainly implemented using optical technology, making
it ideal for secure key distribution over a high bandwidth
free-space optical (FSO) link.
In discrete variable (DV) QKD applied over fibre the
quantum information is usually encoded in a DV of a sin-
gle photon (e.g. time-bin qubit), with a secure range of
order 400 km [1]. However, recently, DV-based QKD
using polarization as the DV was demonstrated in a
free-space satellite-to-ground channel up to a distance
of 1200 km [2]. In [2], a quantum link was established
from the low-Earth-orbit (LEO) Micius satellite to the
Xinglong ground station. This exciting development is
a major step towards realizing global scale secure quan-
tum communications using low-orbit satellites. Indeed,
quantum communication through satellite channels is an-
ticipated to be one of the core technologies enabling the
so-called quantum internet [3].
However, it is uncertain whether DV or continuous
variable (CV) multiphoton technologies (or a combina-
tion of CV-DV) will prevail in free-space optical quan-
tum communication. CV protocols have the advantage
of high-rate, efficient and cost-effective detection (using
homodyne and heterodyne detectors) in comparison to
the sophisticated and expensive single-photon detectors
used for DV protocols. CV-QKD is also perhaps more
compatible with current classical wireless communica-
tions technologies. Initially, CV-QKD was proposed with
discrete and Gaussian encoding of squeezed states [4–7].
Thereafter, Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD with coherent
states was soon developed [8–10].
The simplest-to-deploy CV-QKD protocols are the
GG02 protocol introduced in 2002 by Grosshans and
Grangier using a homodyne detector [9, 10], and its
heterodyne variant (“the no-switching” protocol) [11].
These both involve preparation of a coherent state (CS)
using Gaussian modulation [7, 8]. More specifically, the
quadratures X and P of the coherent state are randomly
modulated according to a Gaussian distribution [8]. In
this paper, we refer to GG02 and the no-switching proto-
col as the CS-Hom protocol and CS-Het protocol, respec-
tively. We state them as the CS-QKD protocols when
we refer to them collectively. The CS-QKD protocols
have been successfully deployed in fibre with non-zero
quantum keys distributed over distances of order 100 km
[8, 12, 13].
The question we address in this work is whether the
simplest-to-deploy CV-QKD protocols, namely the CS-
QKD protocols, will be viable in a real-world LEO
satellite-to-Earth channel. Although extensive theoret-
ical work on CV-QKD through terrestrial FSO channels
has been done in recent years, e.g. [14–21], the only
real-world FSO deployment of any CV-QKD protocol has
been over the short distance of 460 m [22]. The larger
losses due to diffraction over the much longer satellite-
to-Earth channel (as well as disparate turbulence effects)
[23], render any extrapolation of the results in [22] far
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2from obvious. This is compounded by the fact that [22]
deployed a different form of CV-QKD, namely, a CS uni-
dimensional CV-QKD protocol.
Our contributions in this work can be summarized as
follows. We identify the most important factors con-
tributing to the total excess noise of the CS-QKD proto-
cols in the satellite-to-Earth channel. We pay particular
attention to the noise contributions arising from scintilla-
tion and contributions arising from time-of-arrival fluctu-
ations between the transmitted local oscillator (LO) and
the quantum signal. Using our determination of the total
excess noise we then consider a lower bound on the secure
key rates anticipated for the CS-QKD protocols deployed
over the satellite-to-Earth channel. We will consider se-
cure rates in the asymptotic signalling limit for both of
the CS-QKD protocols, and in the finite key limit for the
CS-Het protocol.1
The rest of this work is as follows. In Section II we
review the security models required for calculating the
secret key rate of the CS-QKD protocols in a lossy chan-
nel. In Section III we introduce the system model of the
CS-QKD protocols in the satellite-to-Earth channel, and
review well-known contributions to the total excess noise
from the channel and detectors. In Section IV, we simu-
late the relative intensity fluctuations and time-of-arrival
fluctuations. In Section V, we investigate the impact on
the secret key rate of each noise term. In Section VI,
we discuss the security of the CS-QKD protocols in the
satellite-to-Earth channel and discuss alternative proto-
cols. Finally, we conclude and summarize our findings in
Section VII.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CS-QKD IN A
LOSSY CHANNEL
In our security model of the CS-QKD protocols in the
satellite-to-Earth channel, we assume the eavesdropper
Eve has full access to the quantum channel and per-
forms the most general (coherent) attack. The general
attack is when Eve prepares an optimal global ancilla
state, which may not necessarily be separable. Eve can
prepare any ancillary states to interact with the signal
states and make measurements. In particular, Eve can
have access to a quantum memory, which can store the
signal states until she learns information during the clas-
sical post-processing. In our security model, we perform
the analysis in the entanglement based (EB) version of
the CS-QKD protocols, even though in deployment we
will assume the equivalent prepare and measure (PM)
schemes [24, 25]. In deployment, it is straightforward to
convert measurements from one scheme to the other [24].
Unconditional security against the general attack for
1 Currently, a formal proof of security in the finite limit for the
CS-Hom protocol is unavailable.
the CS-QKD protocols was proven in the asymptotic limit
where an infinite key was assumed [26]. The general at-
tack was proven to reduce to the collective attack using
the de Finetti representation theorem for infinite dimen-
sions [27]. However, in practice, we need to consider
the secret key rate in the finite limit which can only be
-secure, where  is the probability of failure. Uncon-
ditional security of the CS-Hom protocol in the finite
regime is still an open question. However, by exploiting
a new Gaussian de Finetti reduction method, a compos-
able security proof against general attacks for the CS-Het
protocol was recently proven [28].
A. Asymptotic limit
In this section, we review the well-known secret key
rates in the asymptotic limit against general attacks
which provide an upper bound to performance under any
finite limit. We will follow the formalism provided in [29]
and references therein. The covariance matrix describing
the Gaussian modulated coherent state sent from Alice
(A) to Bob (B) has the form,
γAB =
(
aI cσz
cσz bI
)
, (1)
where I = diag(1, 1) is the unity matrix and
σz = diag(1,−1) is the Pauli matrix. For the Gaus-
sian modulated CS-QKD protocols, the coefficients of the
covariance matrix are
a = VA + 1,
b = VB =
ηdT
µ
(VA + χ(T, ηd) + 1),
c =
√
ηdT
µ
√
V 2A + 2VA,
(2)
where VA is Alice’s modulation variance of the quadra-
ture operators, VB is Bob’s measured quadrature vari-
ance, 0 ≤ T ≤ 1 is the transmissivity of the channel, and
ηd is the detector quantum efficiency.
2 The CS-Hom and
CS-Het protocols correspond to µ = 1 and µ = 2, respec-
tively. The term χ(T, ηd) is defined as all noise terms
other than vacuum noise, expressed in vacuum units. In
the literature it is common to distinguish between noise,
χd(ηd), arising from the detector and noise, χch(T ), aris-
ing from the channel transmission where [29],
χ(T, ηd) = χch(T ) +
χd(ηd)
T
, (3)
and where χch(T ) is given by
χch(T ) =
1− T
T
+ ξch. (4)
2 We implicitly assume in all calculations that the vacuum noise
is normalized to 1 by setting ~ = 2.
3Here, ξch is the channel excess noise from various sources
and (1− T )/T is due to channel loss. χd(ηd) is given by
χd(ηd) =
µ− ηd
ηd
+
µξd
ηd
, (5)
where ξd is the detector excess noise and (µ − ηd)/ηd is
noise due to detector losses.
The secret key rate3 against general attacks (in
bits/pulse) under reverse reconciliation in the asymptotic
limit (infinite key rate) is given by [29–31]
K = βIAB − SBE , (6)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the reconciliation efficiency, and SBE
is the upper bound to the Holevo information between
Eve and Bob. In this work we will only consider reverse
reconciliation where Bob sends correction information to
Alice who corrects the bit values in the key (derived from
her quadrature measurement) [32]. The mutual informa-
tion IAB for the CS-QKD protocol is given by
IAB =
µ
2
log2
VA + 1 + χ(T, ηd)
1 + χ(T, ηd)
. (7)
Note that from this point forward, we simplify the
nomenclature with χ(T, ηd) := χ, χch(T ) := χch and
χd(ηd) := χd. Note also, the mutual information be-
comes
IAB =
µ
2
log2
ηdT
µ (VA + ξch) + ξd + 1
ηdT
µ (ξch) + ξd + 1
, (8)
and in the limit T → 0, IAB(T→0) = µ2 log2 1+ξd1+ξd = 0, as
expected.
We use the trusted model throughout the paper, where
Eve can only have access to the channel excess noise χch.
Consequently, in the Holevo information shared between
Eve and Bob in (9), we only consider χch. Eve’s infor-
mation after Bob’s measurement is the upper bound on
the Holevo information,
SBE = S(E)− S(E|B), (9)
where S(E) is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state
before the measurement on mode B (Bob’s mode) and
S(E|B) is conditioned on Bob’s measurement outcome.
Eve is assumed to purify the transmitted state AB re-
sulting in a pure Gaussian state. It was shown that for
a given covariance matrix describing a Gaussian state,
Gaussian attacks are the most optimal attacks that min-
imize the key rates [33]. Therefore, Eve’s entropy is
S(AB) = G(
λ1 − 1
2
) +G(
λ2 − 1
2
), (10)
3 When we refer to “secret key rate” in this paper, we actually
mean a lower bound on the rate.
where G(x) = (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1)− x log2 x and λ1,2 are
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γAB .
For CS-QKD protocols, these are given by [29]
λ1,2 =
√
A′ ±√A′2 − 4B′
2
,where
A′ = (VA + 1)2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(VA + 1 + χch),
B′ = T 2((VA + 1)χch + 1)2,
(11)
and the entropy S(E|B) is
S(E|B) = G(λ3 − 1
2
) +G(
λ4 − 1
2
) +G(
λ5 − 1
2
), (12)
where λ3,4,5 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the con-
ditional covariance matrix characterizing the state after
Bob’s measurement. The eigenvalues λ3,4 are given by,
λ3,4 =
√
C ′ ±√C ′2 − 4D′
2
, (13)
where for the CS-Hom protocol C ′ and D′ are given by
C ′hom =
A′χd + (VA + 1)
√
B′ + T (VA + 1 + χch)
T (VA + 1 + ξ)
,
D′hom =
√
B′
VA + 1 +
√
B′χd
T (VA + 1 + χ)
,
(14)
respectively, and for the CS-Het protocol C ′ and D′ are
given by
C ′het =
1
T 2(VA + 1 + χ)
[A′χ2d +B + 1 + 2χd((VA + 1)
√
B′
+ T (VA + 1 + χch)) + 2T (V
2
A + 2VA)],
D′het =
(
VA + 1 +
√
B′χd
T (VA + 1 + χ)
)2
,
(15)
respectively. Note, λ5 = 1 for both protocols. Using (6)
and (10)-(15), it is then straightforward to calculate the
secret key rate in the asymptotic limit.
B. Finite key size effects
We now consider the practical security of the CS-QKD
protocols using finite-size analysis. In the security anal-
ysis, we consider the Gaussian collective attacks with
-security that was first introduced in [34, 35] and ex-
tended to general attacks in [28, 36–38]. In the infinite
limit the knowledge of the relevant parameters are exact,
but in the finite limit the parameters are estimated with
a finite precision. This precision is related to the prob-
ability PE the true values are not inside the confidence
4interval calculated from the parameter estimation proce-
dure [34, 35]. In the finite limit, the secret key rate in
bits/pulse is given by [37]
K =
n
N
[βIAB−SPEBE ]−
√
n
N
∆AEP (n)− 2
N
log2
1
2
, (16)
where  is the total failure probability of the protocol,
SPEBE is the upper bound of the Holevo information taking
into consideration the finite precision of the parameter
estimation, N is the total number of symbols sent, and
n = N − ne, where ne is the number of symbols used for
parameter estimation. ∆AEP (n) is given by [36, 37]
∆AEP (n) = (d+ 1)
2 + 4(d+ 1)
√
log2(2/s)
+ 2 log2(2/(
2s)) + 4sd/(
√
n),
(17)
where d is the discretization parameter4 and s is a
smoothing parameter corresponding to the speed of con-
vergence of the smooth min-entropy. In the finite-size
regime, one is limited to -security where  = EC +2s+
PA + PE , where PA is the failure probability of the
privacy amplification procedure, and EC is the failure
probability of the error correction. The parameters s
and PA can be optimized computationally [34].
To account for the finite statistics and obtain the value
of SPEBE , the previous covariance matrix (2) for Alice and
Bob becomes [34, 35],
γPEAB = (VA + 1)I √Tmin2 √V 2A + 2VAσz√
Tmin
2
√
V 2A + 2VAσz (
Tmin
2 (VA + ξmax) + 1 + ξd))I
 ,
(18)
where Tmin and ξmax are the minimum and maximum
values of T and ξch, respectively.
The confidence intervals for T and ξ can be calculated
from known distributions of the estimators5 tˆ and σˆ2 to
obtain the lower value of the T interval given by [34, 35],
Tmin =
(
tˆ− zPE/2
√
σˆ2
neVA
)2
, (19)
and the higher value of the ξch interval given by,
ξmax =
(
σˆ2 + zPE/2
σˆ2
√
2√
ne
− 1− ξd
)
/tˆ2, (20)
where zPE/2 satisfies 1 − erf(zPE/2/
√
2) = PE
and erf(x) is the error function defined as
4 d is the bits of precision encoded by the symbol. In this work,
we set d = 5 as in [37].
5 In a real-world deployment the maximum-likelihood estimators
can be computed from the measurement data to determine Tmin
and ξmax [34, 35].
erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
′2
dt′. From a theoretical per-
spective and what we do in this work, we can set the
expectation values of the estimators to
E[tˆ] =
√
ηdT ,
E[σˆ2] = Tηdξch + 1 + ξd.
(21)
Using these values, we can compute Tmin and ξmax. To
determine SPEBE in (16) for the CS-Het protocol, we use
these values in equations (9)-(13) and (15)(i.e. setting
T = Tmin and ξch = ξmax in equations (3)-(5)). The mu-
tual information IAB in (16) is calculated as done before
in (7) using T and ξch. Putting all this together, to cal-
culate the secret key rate with finite size effects in (16),
we make use of the aforementioned quantities SPEBE , IAB ,
and ∆AEP (n) in (17).
In going from optimal Gaussian collective attacks to
general attacks, only the CS-Het protocol is ′-secure
against general attacks with ′ = κ
4
50 , where [28]
κ = max{1, n(dA + dB)(1 + 2
√
[(ln(8/))/2n])
+ (ln(8/)/n)(1− 2
√
[ln(8/)/2k])},
(22)
where dA and dB are the average photon numbers of Al-
ice and Bob’s modes respectively, and k is the number
of modes [28]. However, κ ≈ n and thus  ≈ 50n4 ′. We
choose ′ = 10−9 and number of symbols used for param-
eter estimation6 ne = n = 10
12 which can be obtained in
minutes for a source pulse rate of 100 MHz. To obtain
the secret key rate under general attacks, it is enough to
analyze the security against Gaussian collective attacks
with  = 10−55 and EC = s = PA = PE [28].
III. SATELLITE-TO-EARTH CS-QKD
We present our system model in Fig. 1. Essentially,
a Gaussian modulated coherent state is prepared on
the satellite (Alice) and measured at the ground station
(Bob) using homodyne or heterodyne detection. At Al-
ice’s location in a LEO satellite at altitude H, a strong
laser source generates a coherent state which is divided
by an asymmetrical beamsplitter into the local oscilla-
tor (LO) and the signal path. The laser source generates
pulses at central frequency ω0 of width τ0 and a repetition
rate frep. The laser beam is collimated by a transmitter
aperture of diameter DT . The amplitude and phase cor-
responding to X and P quadratures in the signal path
are Gaussian modulated with the Gaussian distribution
centred at 〈X〉 = 〈P 〉 = 0 with variance VA.
The LO is then multiplexed with the signal (in a differ-
ent polarization mode) and sent to Bob. Both the LO and
6 In the rest of the paper, unless stated otherwise, we choose ne =
n = 1012, implying n/N = 0.5.
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FIG. 1: The PM CS-QKD protocols in the satellite-to-Earth channel. A local oscillator (LO) is sent with the signal by Alice
which passes through a lossy channel of transmissivity T and channel excess noise ξch. Bob receives the signal and the LO
which he uses to perform the homodyne or heterodyne detection. The former is represented by a XB quadrature measurement
(blue), and the latter by two balanced beamsplitters (purple) and two quadrature measurements (blue XB and purple PB). The
heterodyne/homodyne detector efficiency is ηd and the detector excess noise ξd. An entirely equivalent EB scheme is available.
signal are received by an aperture of diameter DR. Using
the LO, Bob monitors the transmissivity T which has a
probability density function PDF PAB(T ) of the channel.
The PDF is integrated up to a maximum possible value of
T = Tmax. In general, the form of this PDF is a function
of many atmospheric parameters, the transceiver aper-
tures, and distance between the transceivers. In the up-
link (Earth-to-satellite) deep fades in the transmissivity
can be anticipated, largely due to beam wander and beam
deformation [39]. In this work, we adopt settings where
the losses in the satellite-to-Earth channel are dominated
by diffraction effects alone. That is, we assume the trans-
missivity is a constant. As we discuss later, reasonable
receiver/transmit apertures render such an assumption
reasonable in the downlink channel.7 However, it is worth
noting here that additional support for a constant trans-
missivity in the downlink comes from the phase-screen
simulations of [40], which show highly-peaked transmis-
sivity PDFs.8
In the CS-Hom protocol, Bob randomly chooses to ei-
ther measure the quadratures X or P with the homodyne
detector and later announces to Alice which quadrature
he measured. In the CS-Het protocol, Bob measures both
X and P using two detectors at the output of a balanced
beamsplitter.
7 Even in cases where non-constant transmissivity is present, chan-
nel post-selection using the LO can render a subset of the chan-
nels to lie within an effective constant transmissivity window.
QKD rates can then be approximated via summation of rates
arising from these subsets.
8 Note the QKD key rates of [40] are based on the use of an LO
generated directly at the receiver (not one transmitted with the
signal), and therefore cannot be directly compared with the key
rates reported here.
A. Noise Components
As shown in (3), we separated the noise due to the
channel χch and the detector χd. Bob’s variance
9 VB of
the quadrature operator in (2) using the definitions in
(4) and (5) is
VB =
ηdT
µ
(VA + χch +
χd
T
+ 1)
=
ηdT
µ
(VA + ξch +
µξd
ηdT
) + 1
=
ηdT
µ
(VA + ξ) + 1,
(23)
where we define the total excess noise as
ξ := ξch +
µξd
ηdT
. (24)
The channel excess noise10 is [24, 41, 42]
ξch = ξta + ξRIN,Atmos + ξBackground
+ ξmod + ξRIN,LO + ξRIN,Signal,
(25)
where the contributions above are the time-of-arrival
fluctuations ξta, relative intensity noise (RIN) due to the
atmosphere ξRIN,Atmos, background noise ξBackground,
modulation noise ξmod, RIN of the LO ξRIN,LO, and RIN
of the signal ξRIN,Signal. We refer the reader to Table I
for a description of these noise components. We note
9 In the limit of T → 0, Bob’s variance of the quadrature operator
reduces to 1 + ξd as expected.
10 The channel excess noise is defined with respect to the input,
and is thus multiplied by the transmissivity T and ηd in the
covariance matrix.
6that the time-of-arrival fluctuations ξta and RIN due to
the atmosphere, ξRIN,Atmos, have not been determined in
the satellite-to-Earth channel. An analysis of these two
excess noise components is discussed in the next section.
Similarly, the detector excess noise11 is [24, 43–47]
ξd = vel + ξADC + ξoverlap + ξLO + ξLeak (26)
where the noise contributions listed are the electronic
noise vel, analogue-digital converter noise ξADC , detector
overlap ξoverlap, LO subtraction noise ξLO, and LO-to-
signal leakage ξLeak. We refer the reader to Table I for a
fuller description of these noise components.
IV. NOISE SIMULATIONS
In the following section, we use the atmospheric chan-
nel to determine the channel excess noise contributions
from the intensity fluctuations of the LO and the time-of-
arrival fluctuations between the LO and signal. Typical
values from the literature of each noise contribution (as
well as our own calculations) are summarised in Table II.
A. Relative intensity - Local oscillator
We follow the procedure presented in [24] to derive the
contribution to the channel excess noise from the vari-
ations in the intensity of the LO, in the context of the
satellite-to-Earth channel. At Bob, the signal and LO
are mixed on a balanced beamsplitter. Photo-detectors
at the outputs measure the intensity and are subtracted
to obtain the quadrature measurement. The difference
in the number operator describes this measurement
∆nˆB = |αLO|(cos(θ)Xˆ + sin(θ)Pˆ ), (27)
where |αLO| is the coherent amplitude, and θ is the phase
of the quadrature measurement. It is clear that oscilla-
tions in the amplitude |αLO| of the LO will introduce
an additional excess noise to the protocol. Assuming
for simplicity we intend to measure the Xˆ quadrature
(θ = 0). Then the difference in number operator is
reduced to ∆nˆB = |αLO|Xˆ. Since the fluctuations in
intensity and the quadratures are independent random
variables, then the variance of the difference in number
operator is proportional to the variance of both LO and
11 The detector excess noise is defined with respect to the output
and hence T and ηd cancel out in the covariance matrix.
quadrature operator,
Var(∆nˆB) = Var(|α|LOXˆ) (28)
= 〈|αLO|2〉〈Xˆ2〉 − 〈|αLO|〉2〈Xˆ〉2
= 〈|αLO|2〉VA
= (Var(|αLO|) + 〈|αLO|〉2)VA, (29)
since 〈Xˆ〉 = 0 and Var(|αLO|) = 〈|αLO|〉2 − 〈|αLO|2〉 is
determined by the intensity fluctuations of the LO and
VA denotes the variance of the quadrature without con-
sidering the effects of the variation of intensity in the LO
(i.e. Alice’s modulation variance). To derive the variance
in the measurement of the Xˆ quadrature considering all
the effects, we rewrite Var(∆nˆB) assuming a constant
intensity LO with amplitude 〈|αLO|〉, and that the RIN
in the quadrature measurement is characterized by the
variance VRIN,LO(Xˆ).
Var(∆nˆB) = Var(〈|αLO|〉Xˆ)
= 〈|αLO|〉2Vtotal(Xˆ)
= 〈|αLO|〉2(VA + VRIN,LO(Xˆ)). (30)
where Vtotal(Xˆ) is the total variance including VA and
the variance of the quadrature operator due to the RIN
of the LO. Comparing both (29) and (30) we get
〈|αLO|〉2VRIN,LO(Xˆ) = Var(|αLO|)VA. (31)
Finally, the resulting noise component is
ξRIN =
Var(|αLO|)
〈|αLO|〉2
VA. (32)
We identify two main sources in the fluctuations of
the intensity of the LO. One is the fluctuations inher-
ent to the laser when it is generated and the second
is the fluctuations caused by the atmospheric fading
channel. Since these two random effects are indepen-
dent, then the noise component due to intensity fluc-
tuations of the LO becomes the sum of the two con-
tributions ξRIN = ξRIN,LO + ξRIN,Atmos. In [24] the
noise term12 due to the fluctuations of the laser is de-
rived and given for a realistic setup with commonly avail-
able lasers. The contribution to the total excess noise is
ξRIN,LO ≈ 0.00035VA. In Table II, ξRIN,LO is shown for
a modulation variance of VA = 5.
Analysing ξRIN,Atmos, we note that the intensity of the
LO is measured over the aperture used by the receiver.
That is, we consider the total power P over the aperture
surface D,
PD =
∫∫
D
|I(x, y)|2dxdy, (33)
12 ξRIN,LO =
1
4
RINLO × BLO × VA where RINLO = 1.4 ×
10−7Hz−1 is the RIN and BLO = 10 KHz is the optical band-
width of the LO [24].
7ξch Channel excess noise component Description
ξta Time-of-arrival fluctuations ξta is the noise component due to the differential modifications between
signal and LO pulses in the satellite-to-Earth channel. Predictions for
this noise component in a terrestrial free-space channel were made in [50],
but not for the satellite-to-Earth channel. We will quantify this noise
component in the next section.
ξRIN,Atmos RIN of LO due to atmosphere ξRIN,Atmos is the noise component due to the scintillation caused by at-
mospheric fluctuations. We will quantify this noise in the next section.
ξRIN,LO RIN of the LO The noise term ξRIN,LO is due to the power fluctuations of the laser before
modulation. This noise component is an intrinsic noise that depends on
the parameters of the laser [24].
ξmod Modulation noise The noise term ξmod is due to the voltage fluctuations in the modulation
of the coherent state at Alice [41]. The signal generator translates bit
information to a voltage which is amplified to drive the modulator [24].
The phase of the quadrature is proportional to the applied voltage. Subse-
quently, the voltage deviation introduced by the signal generator introduces
modulation noise.
ξBackground Background noise Part of the channel excess noise for the satellite-to-Earth channel is photon
leakage from the background ξbackground to the quantum signal and LO
[42].
ξRIN,Signal RIN of the signal Excess noise due to power fluctuations of the laser translates to the RIN
of the signal ξRIN,Signal. This noise component is proportional to the
absolute power variance for a given optical bandwidth of the signal laser
[24]. In comparison to the RIN of the LO due to the laser, the RIN of the
signal is conisderably smaller [24].
ξd Detector excess noise component
vel Electronic noise The term vel is electronic noise that is due to other noise sources of the
detector including thermal noise and clock jitter affecting the detector.
Shot-noise-limited homodyne measurement requires sufficient LO power to
reduce the effect of the electronic noise by increasing the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) [24, 43].
ξADC Analogue-digital converter (ADC)
quantization noise
ξADC is due to digitizing the output voltage, required by all CV-QKD
systems [24, 44, 45]. This noise term can be suppressed by increasing the
number of bits.
ξoverlap Pulse overlap The finite response time of the balanced homodyne/heterodyne detector
causes an electrical pulse overlap ξoverlap [46]. Large peak powers for
shorter pulses can saturate the diodes, causing a non-linear response. This
can be suppressed by ensuring 1
τ20 f
2
rep
>> 1, where τ0 is the pulse width.
ξLO LO fluctuations during subtraction The incomplete subtraction of the output signals by the homo-
dyne/heterodyne detector introduces the noise component ξLO [24, 46].
ξLeak Leakage noise Part of the total excess noise is the photon leakage from the LO to the signal
when the signal is multiplexed with the LO [43, 46]. This term largely
depends on the system design. However, in the polarization-frequency-
multiplexing scheme, this is assumed negligible [47].
TABLE I: Noise components of the total excess noise ξ of CS-QKD the satellite-to-Earth channel.
where I(x, y) is the irradiance of the LO expressed
in Cartesian coordinates with the aperture centred at
(x, y) = (0, 0). In (32), the term V ar(|αLO|)〈|αLO〉2 is the nor-
malized intensity variance known as the scintillation in-
dex σ2SI . We can quantify the scintillation index averaged
over the aperture surface D with diameter DR
σ2SI(DR) =
〈P 2D〉
〈PD〉2 − 1. (34)
Then the ξRIN,Atmos noise component can be rewritten
as
ξRIN,Atmos = σ
2
SI(DR)VA. (35)
The value of σ2SI(DR) can be obtained for weak atmo-
spheric turbulence by using the atmospheric models pre-
sented in Appendix A, and calculating the first and sec-
ond order statistical moments of the irradiance [48]. The
result is
σ2SI(DR) = 8.70k
7/6(H − h0)5/6 sec11/6(ζ)
× Re
∫ H
h0
C2n(h)
[(
kD2R
16H
+ i
h− h0
H − h0
)5/6
−
(
kD2R
16H
)5/6]
dh,
(36)
where k = ω0/c is the wavenumber of the laser frequency
8Parameter Ref.
ξch Channel excess noise 0.0186; 0.0126
ξta Time-of-arrival fluctuations 0.006 This paper
ξRIN,Atmos RIN of LO due to atmosphere 0.01; 0.003 This paper
ξRIN,LO Relative intensity noise of LO 0.0018 [24]
ξmod Modulation noise 0.0005 [41]
ξBackground Background noise 0.0002 [42]
ξRIN,Signal Relative intensity noise of signal < 0.0001 [24]
ξd Detector noise 0.0133
vel Electronic noise 0.013 [43, 46]
ξADC Analogue-digital converter noise 0.0002 [44, 45]
ξoverlap Detector overlap < 0.0001 [46]
ξLO LO subtraction noise < 0.0001 [24, 46]
ξLeak LO to signal leakage < 0.0001 [43, 46, 47]
TABLE II: Excess noise break-down affecting satellite-to-Earth CS-QKD during daylight.
FIG. 2: Aperture averaged scintillation index for different
receiver aperture diameters and zenith angles.
ω0 (c is the speed of light), ζ is the zenith angle, H is the
altitude of the satellite at zenith angle ζ = 0, h0 = 0 km
is the altitude of the receiver ground station, and C2n(h)
is the refractive index structure of the atmosphere (see
Appendix A). In Fig. 2 we present the values of σ2SI(DR)
for different receiver aperture diameters and zenith an-
gles. We see the importance of using a large aperture in
the receiver, since not only is it essential for increasing
the transmissivity of the channel but also to reduce the
fluctuations on intensity which translates to excess noise.
The values of ξRIN,Atmos are calculated for the receiver
aperture diameter DR = 1 m and DR = 3 m at ζ = 60
◦
and altitude H = 500 km are given in Table II. These
are ξRIN,Atmos = 0.01 and 0.003, respectively. For the
rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified, we use the
former value for DR = 1 m.
B. Time-of-arrival fluctuations
Now we derive the pulse deformations due to trans-
mission through the satellite-to-Earth channel, used in
the calculation of the time-of-arrival fluctuations of our
Table II. In [49] an analysis based on the mutual coher-
ence function (MCF) is made, where the two-frequency
MCF is defined by the average of all ensemble of pulses
(see equations (11)-(28) in [49]). The MCF represents
the product of the free space optical fields and the tur-
bulence factor based on the first and second order Rytov
approximation. Since LEO satellites are positioned at a
high enough altitude we can treat the propagation of the
wave as in the far-field regime. In this regime the wave
as seen by the receiver corresponds to a plane wave.
In the far-field regime corresponding to the Fresnel pa-
rameter Ω = ω0W
2
0 /(2Lc) << 1 where W0 is the beam-
waist, L is the total distance travelled by the pulse, and
c is the speed of light. The beam-waist is determined by
the transmitter aperture diameter which is a fundamen-
tal system parameter, as it dominates over many of the
effects occurring during optical propagation. The tempo-
ral mean intensity in the far-field regime is obtained by
averaging over the bandwidth of the MCF at the same
radial position and time. From [49], the result is
〈I(r, L, t′)〉 ≈ τ
2
0
τ1
(
W 20
2Lc
)2
τ20 [(1 + ω
2
0τ
2
0 ) + (W0r/Lc)
2]
τ1[τ20 + (W0r/Lc)
2]5/2
× exp
{
− ω
2
0τ
2
0 (W0r/Lc)
2
2[τ20 + (W0r/Lc)
2]
}
× exp
{
−2(t
′ − L/c− r2/2Lc)2
τ21
}
, (37)
where t′ is the time, r the radial coordinate over the
wavefront of the pulse, τ0 is the initial pulse width, and
the broadened pulse width τ1 is
τ1 =
√
τ20 + 8α,
α =
0.391(1 + 0.171δ2 − 0.287δ5/3)ν1 sec(ζ)
c2
, (38)
9FIG. 3: Ratio of pulse broadening as a function of initial pulse
width and for different zenith angles.
and where ν1 is the following integral (which we evaluate
numerically),
ν1 =
∫ H
h0
C2n(h)L0(h)
5/3dh. (39)
Here δ = L0l0 where L0 and l0 denote the outer and in-
ner scales, respectively. The inner and outer scales are
introduced alongside the atmospheric model described in
Appendix A. Any optical pulse sent thought through the
atmosphere, will incur deformations due to variations of
the refractive index of atmospheric turbulence. To fully
analyse the pulse deformations we consider two effects;
the broadening of the pulse, and the changes on the time-
of-arrival of the pulse. Both of these effects are charac-
terised by the value of τ1. First, the broadening of the
pulse will cause an attenuation of the average light in-
tensity of the received signal by a factor of τ0/τ1 [50]. In
Fig. 3 we show the ratio τ0/τ1 as a function of τ0 for the
satellite-to-Earth channel with the parameters specified
above. We see that the pulse broadening becomes con-
siderable only for pulse widths τ0 < 0.1 ps. However, for
a pulse width τ0 = 130 ps commonly used in CV-QKD
systems consistent with a 100 MHz repetition rate [43],
the pulse broadening effect is negligible.
The second, and more relevant effect is the variation
of the time-of-arrival ta at the detector between the sig-
nal and the LO pulses. As shown in [51], the statis-
tical properties of the time-of-arrival are obtained from
the temporal statistical moments of the complex enve-
lope describing the pulse. The analysis shows that the
time-of-arrival mean and variance equal 〈ta〉 = L/c and
σ2ta =
τ21
4 , respectively. In satellite-to-Earth CS-QKD,
the fluctuations of the time-of-arrival caused by the at-
mospheric channel contribute to the total excess noise as
an additional amount [50]
ξta = 2VAω
2
0(1− ρta)σ2ta, (40)
where ρta is the timing correlation coefficient between
LO and the signal. We set the correlation coefficient be-
tween signal and LO to ρta = 1 − 10−13 as in [50]. The
noise component due to time-of-arrival fluctuations (40)
increases with the pulse width τ1. In Table II, we deter-
mine the value for this noise component to be ξta = 0.006
for a pulse width of τ0 = 130 ps and central frequency
ω0 = 2pi × 200 THz (corresponding to a wavelength of
1550 nm).
The LO generated by Alice must have sufficient in-
tensity at Bob such that he can perform a hetero-
dyne/homodyne measurement. Typically, 108 photons
per pulse are required at Bob’s side. With a 100 MHz
pulse repetition rate and pulse width of 130 ps, the re-
quired LO average power for a 20 dB channel loss (a typ-
cial loss considered here) at Alice’s side is 130 mW (at
1550 nm). We have chosen the repetition rate to coincide
with current detector technology [43]. There are readily
available coherent laser sources with these specifications.
We assume the ground station has a state-of-the-art ho-
modyne detector as in [46].
In Fig. 4, we compare the noise components contri-
bution for daylight operation. As T gets smaller, the
term µξdηdT in (24) would dominate, but for the purpose of
this figure, we compare each noise component on equal
footing by setting T = 1 and ηd = 1. In this figure, we
adopt the following values for the noise components. The
electronic noise vel = 0.013 is the dominant noise compo-
nent. The next dominant noise component is the relative
intensity noise due to the atmosphere. For the purpose
of the noise analysis, we assume the realistic scenario,
where the satellite zenith angle is ζ = 60◦ (which is suffi-
cient for a 2−3 minutes flyby [2]), a transmitter aperture
diameter of DT = 0.3 m and a receiver aperture diameter
of DR = 1 m with an altitude H = 500 km, implying a
relative intensity noise of ξRIN,atmos = 0.01.
The next dominant noise component is the time-of-
arrival fluctuations. We set the correlation coefficient
between signal and LO to ρta = 1 − 10−13 as in [50].
Fig. 3 suggests that for pulse widths τ0 > 0.1 ps, the
pulse broadening due to weak turbulence is negligible
and τ1 ≈ τ0. Thus, the excess noise due to time-of-arrival
fluctuations is ta = 0.006. As expected, this noise com-
ponent doesn’t depend on the receiver aperture diameter.
Furthermore, ξRIN,LO is 6% of the total excess noise.
ADC noise is negligible (1%) as part of the detector noise
component. All other noises ξRIN,Signal, ξLO and ξLeak
are less than 1% of the total excess noise with the excep-
tion of the modulation noise which is 2% [24]. Therefore,
the predicted channel excess noise is ξch = 0.0186 and
the detector excess noise ξd = 0.0133.
DR H ζ ηd β VA τ0 λ ξch ξd
1 m 500 km 60o 0.95 0.95 5 130 ps 1550 nm 0.0186 0.0133
TABLE III: System parameters.
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Other noise
1%
ADC noise
1%
Background noise
1%Modulation noise
2% 
RIN LO
6%
Time-of-arrival 
fluctuations
19%
RIN Atmosphere
31%
Electronic noise
40%
FIG. 4: Pie chart of noise contributions to ξ = ξch +
µξd
ηdT
for CS-Hom protocol (µ = 1) in the satellite-to-Earth channel for
daylight operation. We have used values from Table II with laser pulse width τ0 = 130 ps and state-of-the-art homodyne
detector specifications with NLO = 10
8. The dominant noise term is the electronic noise at 40%, followed by RIN due to the
atmosphere at 31%, the time-of-arrival fluctuations at 19% and the RIN of the LO at 6%.
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FIG. 5: Secret key rate in the asymptotic limit plotted against
transmissivity for CS-Hom (red) vs. CS-Het (blue) for dif-
ferent channel excess noises ξch = 0 (solid) and our chosen
satellite-to-Earth channel (dashed).
V. SECRET KEY RATES OF
SATELLITE-TO-EARTH CS-QKD
In Fig. 5, we calculate the secret key rate in the asymp-
totic limit against the transmissivity T for both CS-Hom
and CS-Het protocols using the parameters in Table III.
Unless otherwise specified, for the rest of the paper, we
use the parameters in Table III. The transmissivity on
the x-axis is converted to units of dB using the formula
−10 × log T . We compare the channel excess noises of
ξch = 0 and that of our specified satellite-to-Earth chan-
nel. For the chosen parameter values, corresponding to
a realistic experimental scenario, the difference in the
Collective
General
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FIG. 6: Secret key rate in the finite limit for the CS-Het pro-
tocol for collective and general attacks plotted against trans-
missivity for different n = 1010 (dotted line), n = 1012 (solid
line) and the asymptotic limit (dashed line).
secret key rate between CS-Hom and CS-Het is only ev-
ident at low loss in which the CS-Het protocol performs
marginally better. The modulation variance VA is an ad-
justable parameter that can be optimized to maximize
the secret key rate with the total excess noise and trans-
missivity [24]. However, in atmospheric channels the
transmissivity can fluctuate (although here we assume
not) and the optimal value of VA at one time may not
be the optimal value at another time. Unless the goal
is to maximize the secret key rate each run, additional
resources to optimize VA are not necessary. In our sys-
tem, we choose a value of VA = 5 which is in the range of
optimality for the values of transmissivity in the satellite-
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to-Earth channel.
In Fig. 6 we calculate the secret key rate in the fi-
nite case against the transmissivity T . As seen in Fig. 6
for the CS-Het protocol, the loss that can be tolerated
(compared to the asymptotic limit) is less in the finite
size regime for n = 1010 and n = 1012. In this same
figure, we compare the key rates for collective and gen-
eral attacks using the failure probability  = 10−9 and
 = 10−55 (′ = 10−9), respectively. It is evident that the
general attack does not tolerate as much loss. Note it is
straightforward to convert all key rate into units of bits/s
by multiplying by the laser pulse repetition frequency.13
In Table IV the individual impact of each noise term
on the secret key rate under collective Gaussian attacks
is shown14 in the finite size regime with n = 1012.
The background noise during daylight is approximately
1% of the total excess noise for 1550 nm light (0.0002)
[42]. In DV-QKD, background noise from daylight can
be mitigated using small spatial filtering coupled with
advanced adaptive optics [53]. It was noted in [3] that
optical systems used in CV-QKD could also use small
spectral bandwidth. Consequently, the background noise
can be filtered, allowing for daylight operation. Daylight
CV technology was demonstrated in [54], but there are
no corresponding studies for CV-QKD.
We find that the background noise component during
daylight in CS-QKD in the satellite-to-Earth channel has
negligible impact on the secret key rate, in agreement
with [42]. For night-time operation, the secret key rate
would be unchanged with ξBackground < 10
−7. Thus, the
secret key rate in Fig. 6 is a lower bound, and night-
time operation would improve the key rates, but is not
essential.
We consider how increasing the size of the receiver
aperture improves the secret key rates under general at-
tacks. For a larger receiver aperture of DR = 3 m, we
obtain a smaller channel excess noise of ξch = 0.0126 and
detector excess noise of ξd = 0.0133. At the transmissiv-
ity T = 15 dB, a secret key rate of 2.6× 10−3 bits/pulse
is attained under general attacks for this larger receiver
aperture. T = 15 dB is readily achievable in the satellite-
to-Earth channel using this larger receiver aperture. For
example, for the transmitter aperture of DT = 0.3 m at
transceiver separation 1200 km the beam width at the
13 In real-world crytopgraphy it is the key rate in bits/s that is ulti-
mately of interest. However, conversion from bits/pulse to bit/s
must consider the time to decode the finite, but very large block
lengths (multiplying by the pulse repetition rate is only formally
valid when the reconciliation time is zero). Optimisation of the
bit/s key rate can be non-trivial in some circumstances [52].
14 Note in our calculations we have assumed that the transmissiv-
ity remains constant over the block length. Receiving a block
length of 1012 from a 100MHz source would require minutes of
transmission time. For block lengths larger than 1010 it is likely
that the impact of satellite motion on transmissivity would need
to be considered within the calculations unless a corresponding
higher-rate source was utilised.
ground is 12 m (and a diffraction limited divergence of
10 µrad), giving a diffraction loss of 22 dB for receiver
aperture DR = 1 m (see discussion below for Micius).
Extrapolating from these parameters, the receiver aper-
ture diameter of DR = 2.3 m gives a diffraction loss of
15 dB. For this receiver aperture of DR = 2.3 m, the
channel excess noise is ξch = 0.015 and a secret key rate
of 2.4×10−3 bits/pulse is attained under general attacks.
We consider how the secret key rate changes with the
system parameters in Table III. For example, doubling
the pulse period to τ0 = 260 ps, will give a channel ex-
cess noise of ξch = 0.033. However, the secret key rate is
barely changed (i.e. 1.0× 10−3 bits/pulse). We also find
that from VA = 2 to VA = 8, the result doesn’t signifi-
cantly change. Hence, this main result is not sensitive to
parameters we have chosen for the figures.
As we grew close to the completion of our study, three
other works related to CV-QKD over satellite-to-Earth
channels appeared [38, 55]. Different from our study,
these latter works had a focus on the large-scale fading
effects on the QKD key rates, and different excess noise
contributions. They therefore apply to different system
models than the diffraction-only loss models we explored
here. However, collectively the works of [38, 55] and ours
illustrate clearly that CV-QKD in the satellite-to-Earth
channel is feasible.
Although our focus has been to demonstrate the viabil-
ity of the CS-QKD protocols in satellite-to-Earth chan-
nel, it is perhaps interesting to compare our results di-
rectly with Micius. In our calculations of the secret
key rates, we have assumed that transmissivity is con-
stant.15 That is, transmissivity fluctuations due to at-
mospheric turbulence and beam-wandering are assumed
small in comparison to diffraction losses [56]. As just
mentioned above, in the Micius satellite QKD experi-
ment, the satellite-to-Earth channel loss due to diffrac-
tion was 22 dB at a maximum distance of 1200 km with
a transmitter aperture of DT = 0.3 m, a far-field diver-
gence of 10 µrad and receiver aperture of DR = 1 m [2].
Additional loss occurred via atmospheric absorption and
turbulence (3 to 8 dB), and loss due to pointing error
(< 3 dB). This gave an average total loss of 30 ± 3 dB.
In calculations of the Micius QKD key rate, the failure
probability was set to  = 10−9 which gave a key rate of
1.38 × 10−5 bits/pulse. In comparison, for our CS-Het
protocol at the same security setting and same losses we
find zero key rate under general attacks. It is only for
losses less than 25 dB that we find non-zero rates under
15 The statistical nature of the turbulence only manifests itself in
our calculations through the excess noise contributions. In par-
ticular, this is through the impact of scintillation on ξRIN,Atmos
and on the random refractive index perturbations on ξta. Under
the assumption of diffraction-only losses, the constant transmis-
sivity T of the channel is determined via the system parameters,
DT , DR and L. Of course, these parameters must be set so that
the diffraction-only loss assumption is a reasonable one.
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Parameter Description Value K
K0
@ 10 dB K
K0
@ 20 dB K
K0
@ 30 dB
ξch Channel excess noise 0.0186 0.75 0.63 0.00
ξta Time-of-arrival fluctuations 0.006 0.91 0.87 0.00
ξRIN,Atmos Relative intensity noise due to atmosphere 0.01 0.85 0.79 0.00
ξBackground Background noise 0.0002 1.00 1.00 0.93
ηd Detector efficiency 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
vel Electronic noise 0.013 0.99 0.99 0.81
TABLE IV: Individual impact of each noise term on secret key rate under collective Gaussian attacks relative to ideal case
of no noise with K in the finite size regime (i.e. the ratio K
K0
= 1 for no impact and K
K0
= 0 for maximum impact). Other
parameter values: n = 1012,  = 10−9, modulation variance VA = 5 and reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95.
general attacks. We do caution however, that direct com-
parisons of these two very different technologies (DV vs.
CV) are limited in value because the security assump-
tions are different. We also point out the Micius secu-
rity analysis disregards information leakage due to side-
channel imperfections [2]. Other assumptions underpin-
ning the Micius key rate are discussed in [57]. However,
to be fair, we have also overlooked some assumptions that
underpin our CV-QKD analysis. The most important of
these are in regard to the LO - an issue we discuss next.
VI. LO HACKING
A. Attacks
An underlying assumption implicit in key rates we have
determined for the CS-QKD protocols is that the trans-
mission of the LO through the satellite-to-Earth channel
is secure and not interfered with. However, clearly this
assumption is suspect as an eavesdropper can in principle
obtain access to the LO, modify the channel, and subse-
quently obtain information on the quantum key. Here we
briefly discuss this important caveat. We mention some
specific attacks, and some countermeasures.
Equal-amplitude attack. In this attack, Eve intercepts
both the LO and quantum signal and performs homo-
dyne detections on both [58]. Eve produces two squeezed
states with the same intensity level. Bob cannot discover
the attack because the expected noise is less than the
shot noise level. When Bob compares the difference in his
measurement with Alice’s prepared state to the threshold
from theoretical security proofs, he mistakenly confirms
the channel is secure [32, 59]. Eve has therefore com-
promised the channel. However, this security loophole
can be solved if Bob can monitor the fluctuations in the
intensity of the LO [60].
Wavelength attack. In this attack, Eve modifies the
intensity transmission of Bob’s beamsplitter by chang-
ing the wavelength of the light from Alice. This wave-
length attack deems the final keys insecure. However, it
was shown in [61], that adding a simple wavelength filter
randomly before measuring the intensity of the LO can
prevent this attack.
Calibration attack. The device calibration routine of
the LO is susceptible to an intercept-resend attack. That
is, the eavesdropper manipulates the LO pulses to change
the clock pulses used for the detection [62]. Eve changes
the shape of the LO pulse which consequently induces
a delay in the clock trigger. The homodyne detection
will measure a lower intensity. Therefore, there will be
a decrease in the response slope between the variance of
the homodyne detection and the LO power. As a result,
the shot noise will be overestimated and the excess noise
underestimated [63]. Countermeasures to this attack in-
volves monitoring the shot noise in real time.
B. Local local oscillators
Motivated by these security loopholes, there has re-
cently been a focus on using true local oscillators or local
local oscillators (LLO). In one use of an LLO, a system
model is proposed where reference pulses are sent with
the signal [64]. In this system model, two lasers are used,
one at Alice for generating the quantum signal and an-
other at Bob for the LLO. To establish a common phase
reference, Alice sends low intensity pulses to estimate the
phase and correct the heterodyne measurement [44, 65].
However, additional excess noise is introduced. Since the
LLO and signal are not phase locked, the necessary phase
estimation is limited by quantum uncertainty. Addition-
ally, the laser spectral line-width introduces other phase
noise related to the timing of the pulses. Currently, no
phase compensation method exists for the LLO in FSO
channels [66]. Photon leakage from the LLO to the sig-
nal is also unavoidable. Keeping the excess noise tolera-
ble places limits on the intensity of the reference pulses
needed for efficient homodyne/heterodyne detection.
However, pilot symbols are also subject to manipula-
tion by an adversary, and therefore susceptible to attacks
outside the scope of current security proofs (e.g. [67]).
What is really required is a system that avoids the use
of any reference signals at all for the phase referencing.
Only by this means do the assumptions underpinning for-
mal security proofs for the CV-QKD protocols we have
discussed here remain intact. Recent work along these
lines is given in [68] where publicly announced raw key
values are invoked to determine the phase offsets to be
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applied to the LLO. However, currently even these types
of phase determinations for the LLO are not formally
proven secure - an issue that hopefully will be addressed
in forthcoming works.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we investigated the feasibility of the
simplest-to-deploy CV-QKD protocols, the CS-QKD pro-
tocols, over the satellite-to-Earth channel. We reviewed
the security of these two protocols, as well as the com-
ponents of the total excess noise most relevant to the
satellite-to-Earth channel. Through new calculations we
then determined that the most important sources of noise
in our protocols over the satellite-to-Earth channel was
the relative intensity noise due to the atmosphere, and
the time-of-arrival fluctuations between the signal and
LO. We next focused on the CS-QKD protocol with het-
erodyne detection in the deployable setting of a finite
key regime. Given reasonable transceiver aperture sizes,
and assuming diffraction as the only source of loss, we
found that reasonable QKD key rates under general at-
tacks can be anticipated. We therefore concluded that
CV-QKD with information-theoretic unconditional secu-
rity in the satellite-to-Earth channel is entirely feasible.
In closing we noted our information-theoretic security as-
sumes that the LO is secured from manipulation by an
adversary. Future useful work in this area could include
formal security proofs of finite-limit CS-QKD with ho-
modyne detection, and formal proofs of security under
LO (or reference pulse) attacks.
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Appendix A: Atmospheric models
Turbulence in the Earth’s atmosphere is caused by
random variation in temperature and pressure. These
variations alter the air’s refractive index both spatially
and temporally, distorting any optical waves propagat-
ing through the atmosphere. Distortions of the pulses
transmitted such as beam deformation and beam wan-
dering are one of the main sources of photon loss in the
channel. To model the effects of the turbulent atmo-
sphere on the optical signals we use Kolmogorov’s theory
of turbulent flow [69]. The strength of the turbulence is
characterized by the refractive index structure parame-
ter, C2n. Kolmogorov’s theory is based upon the insight
that turbulence is induced by eddies in the atmosphere.
The scale of the turbulence can be characterised by an
inner-scale l0, and an outer-scale L0 [48]. Eddies with a
size lower than the inner-scale cannot exist since the tur-
bulence at such scales is dissipated into the atmosphere
as heat. The outer-scale denotes the upper-bound to the
eddy size and is the scale at which energy is injected into
the turbulence.
To model the atmospheres vertical profile of the refrac-
tive index structure parameter, we use the widely used
Hufnagel-Valley model [70],
C2n(h) = 0.00594(v/27)
2(10−5h)10 exp(−h/1000) (A1)
+ 2.7× 10−16 exp(−h/1500) +A exp(−h/100),
with h the altitude in meters, v = 21 the rms wind-
speed (m/s), and A = 1.7 × 10−14 the nominal value of
C2n(0) at the ground. Additionally, measurements made
of the scintillation suggest the outer scale L0 changes
with the altitude according to the empirical Coulman-
Vernin profile [71]
L0(h) =
4
1 +
(
h−8500
2500
)2 . (A2)
Finally, the inner scale is assumed to directly propor-
tional to the outer scale l0 = δL0, with δ = 0.005 [49].
To describe the fluctuations of the refractive index we
use a spectral density function [72]
Φφ(κ) = 0.49r
−5/3
0
exp(−κ2/κ2m)
(κ2 + κ20)
11/6
, (A3)
with κ the radial spatial frequency on a plane orthogonal
to the propagation direction, κm = 5.92/l0, κ0 = 2pi/L0,
and r0 the Fried parameter for a vertical propagation
length [48]
r0 =
(
0.423k2 sec(ζ)
∫ H
h0
C2n(h)dh
)−3/5
, (A4)
where h0 and H correspond to the lower and upper alti-
tudes of the propagation path.
